If one adopts the innovation systems approach and if one continues to hold, with Chandler, that technological innovation is a key element in the evolution of business organization, then one must accept the following conclusion: the state is a critical area for business history research, because the state has a central place in the national system of innovation. A quick glance at several of the key growth industries of the late twentieth century lends empirical support to this conclusion. In pharmaceuticals, electronics, and aircraft, government organizations, government-funded university laboratories, government procurement, government regulations, and publicly provided infrastructure have been essential to technological change and the organizational development of firms. But the argument is not confined to recent times. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the period that most occupies chandler's attention, and even before, national innovation systems profoundly shaped business history. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, and Mulford, 1895-1995 , which won the Newcomen Prize in 1997, demonstrates that the innovation systems approach has begun to have some influence on business history. As the title suggests, Galambos and Sewell attend to the traffic in knowledge across organizational boundaries that dates back to the origins of Merck. Constrained by the "corporate biography" genre, however, the book remains essentially a Chandlerian story of managerial and scientific opportunity-seeking, enriched at the margins by reference to actors and forces outside the firm, including public hospitals and research organizations, regulations, patent laws, and the like. 6 Hart, "Corporate Technological Capabilities and the State," response to KL, August 7, 2003, p. 4 This paper goes beyond Galambos and Sewell's pioneering effort, in identifying ways to bring the state further in from the margins of business history. My claim is that the state shapes corporate technological capabilities fundamentally. The agency of managers is not eliminated in this approach, but they must share the spotlight with other actors. A deeper understanding of the linkages between firms and the rest of the innovation system will strengthen the explanatory power of business history. Equally important, business historians can add substantial value to the ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue about innovation systems. As Richard R. Nelson, a major figure in this dialogue puts it, firms comprise "the heart" of innovation systems. Most of us are general practitioners when it comes to diagnosing the system, and we could use a few more cardiologists. 7 
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Corporate Technological Capabilities
Corporate capabilities distinguish firms as organized entities from mere bundles of resources. Entrepreneurs and managers assemble resources, including other people, facilities and equipment, money, and some forms of knowledge (such as licensed intellectual property); they attempt to add value to this assemblage by linking these resources together in specific ways.
These linkages lead over time to the development of commitments, routines, practices, and firmspecific knowledge, which comprise the capabilities that allow the firm to execute its strategy. 8 Technological capabilities are a subset of corporate capabilities. They allow the firm to discover, develop, assimilate, deploy, and extend new ways of doing things. Whereas Chandler conceives of the essential function of "organized human capabilities" as the "exploit[ation of] the potential of technological processes," the definition advanced here emphasizes the firm's creativity. This creativity is embedded in people, including R&D personnel and production Hart , "Corporate Technological Capabilities and the State," response to KL, August 7, 2003, p. 5 workers as well as the managers who devise strategies and allocate resources. It may be enhanced by certain routines and practices and perhaps even by the layout of equipment and facilities (including the architecture of information systems). 9 Corporate technological capabilities have consequences of great importance to business historians. As Chandler (among many others) shows, creative firms grow rapidly, and they evolve in form and function. They produce goods and services that large segments of society value. They create jobs and contribute substantially to the overall growth of the economy. They may also produce negative externalities, including new forms of environmental degradation and displacement of older forms of economic life. Firms that have developed significant technological capabilities are, as Joseph A. Schumpeter famously put it, the main agents of "creative destruction." 10 Although managers assemble the resources to build technological capabilities, they could not do so in the absence of an institutional infrastructure in which the state figures significantly.
For example, technological capabilities depend heavily on public goods, such as an highly educated population. Firms are unlikely to invest in the education of people who can take their human capital out the door at the end of their contracts, but contracts with terms long enough to reap the benefits of such investments would look suspiciously like slavery. Government subsidies provide one way around this impasse. Similarly, firms are unlikely to create technological knowledge unless they have some protection against the threat of imitation by competitors. Without this protection, all firms have an incentive to free ride on knowledge created by others. In the extreme, these incentives create a prisoner's dilemma in which no firm will create knowledge. Intellectual property rights, enforced by public institutions, provide one solution to this conundrum; public spending on R&D provides another.
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These public policies --and the institutions that comprise innovation systems more generally --can be characterized as responses to market failures that derive from the properties of knowledge itself. Knowledge simply cannot be exchanged in the same way that material goods can. 11 This understanding of innovation systems poses a challenge to the Chandlerian paradigm, but it is only a beginning. Political popularity, military effectiveness, and a host of other motivations that go far beyond the desire to perfect the market influence the development of these systems. Corporate technological capabilities emerge not merely from market processes nor from deliberate attempts to solve market failures, but from a range of societal endeavors, including those of the state.
National Systems of Innovation: Big Structures, Huge Comparisons
The evidence linking national innovation systems to corporate technological capabilities is just beginning to be amassed. In this section, I simply want to establish a prima facie case that such a linkage exists, to set the stage for a more detailed discussion of the mechanisms through which it works. The prima facie case turns on (as Charles Tilly would have it) "huge comparisons" that illuminate these "big structures." 12 One set of comparisons is between premodern and modern societies. Lacking states, premodern societies were technologically stagnant and organizationally sluggish. The second set of comparisons ranges across modern states. Differences among states coincide with differences in patterns of technological innovation. These patterns also coincide with variations in forms of economic organization, several of which confusingly share the same label, "capitalist." These two huge comparisons suggest that modern states and business enterprises (including corporations from the midnineteenth century on) evolved together and together gave birth to industrial technology. example has now been widely followed. 17 Hart, "Corporate Technological Capabilities and the State," response to KL, August 7, 2003, p. 9 Ergas argued that some capitalist countries tend to "shift" from one technological trajectory to the next, while others "deepen" their capabilities within an existing trajectory.
Japan, he claimed, does both. The most recent work in this genre labors to give these indicators a microeconomic underpinning by showing that systematic differences among the varieties of capitalism produce systematic differences in the innovation strategies of the firms that are governed by them. 
From National Systems To Corporate Capabilities: Four Mechanisms of Influence
The literature on the varieties of capitalism seeks to find a one-to-one correspondence between each national innovation system and the dominant strategy of its domestic firms. The desire for law-like causal statements, which drives this effort, forces this school's exponents into overly-broad generalizations that transcend industries, technological systems, and historical eras.
By attempting to explain too much with too little, they open themselves to a devastating empirical critique. They also wash out many of the details that motivate historical research, details which --given the presumption of path-dependency --are necessary to build a convincing causal story.
On the other hand, mainstream business historians, to the extent that they consider the state at all, err in the opposite direction. A contract here, a tax break there, and a lawsuit over there sometimes add up to a set of incentives that drives the scientific and technological investment of a firm in a new direction. In telling the story of a firm, a corporate biographer of course ought to attend to such instances. Yet, this approach tends to push too much into the background the long-term and pervasive policies and institutional processes that shape the firm's underlying technological capacities. The interactions between public and private are more intricate and subtle than can be captured by following the headlines. influence the corporation and that the importance of each mechanism undoubtedly varies over time, among countries, and across economic sectors. This debate, then, supplies a checklist of potentially promising research questions that can be used to explore particular historical cases.
The checklist that I work through below encompasses four ways of looking at the state --as organization, fisc, system of rules, and normative order. 22 Each of these "states" may shape corporate technological capabilities, and sometimes all do so simultaneously. This approach navigates between the one-size-fits-all approach of the "varieties of capitalism" literature and the custom tailoring of the corporate biographers.
The State as Organization
One way to see the state is as an organization (or collection of organizations) that participates in markets just like firms. Though the state has a different revenue source and authority structure than the firm, these distinctive features are more or less irrelevant in interactions mediated by the market. Corporate technological capabilities are shaped by this state in much the same way that they are shaped by other firms: as customer, insurer, supplier, and competitor.
The state as customer is the most familiar and most important of these relationships.
Public tasks have often proven to be the "killer app" that launched important technological innovations as commerical products. Jet aircraft, nuclear power plants, and electronic computers, for instance, were supplied to military organizations before they found civilian uses.
Thomas Watson, Sr., the founder of IBM, famously stated that the market for computers was limited to a few big government customers. The Atomic Energy Commission was a particularly important customer for early computers; the U.S. Air Force and Navy also bought them and much other high-technology hardware. Security provided by government customers allows firms to invest in people, equipment, and knowledge that become crucial assets in the long-run battle for civilian markets. Public customers, in turn, sometimes serve as "lead users" that provide knowledge essential for making incremental improvements in products and processes. World
War II era relationships among procurement officers and aircraft manufacturers illustrate this sort of relationship, in which the customer's influence extended deep into the innovation and production processes and provided producers with feedback essential for making improvements in design and manufacturing. 23 The influence of the state as customer may be so pervasive that it affects the organizational structure and strategic decisions of the firm. Some firms, for example, establish divisions specifically to serve government organizations, while others eschew this segment of the market for fear that relationships with these customers will undermine their ability to compete in other markets. These organizational decisions may have important consequences for corporate technological capabilities. Whether new technologies can be "spun off" from government to non-government uses, for instance, may depend on whether networks within the firm span internal boundaries created in response to government customers. 24 Government organizations exert a somewhat weaker gravitational pull on corporate technological capabilities as insurers than they do as customers. The insurer may encourage Pharmaceutical and medical device companies that bring these treatments to market must find knowledge and legitimacy elsewhere. (The reader should bear in mind, though, that these treatments are often subsidized in other ways, such as through direct and indirect support of R&D.) On the other hand, government insurance has typically paid high prices for such treatments once they are proven, setting the pattern for private insurers as well. 25 The latter effect seems to have been the stronger one, helping U.S. firms to become among the world's most innovative (and profitable) in these industries. While health coverage is the biggest element of the American state's insurance portfolio, crop insurance, mortgage insurance, and disaster assistance might also be cited as potential influences on corporate technological capabilities. 26 Government organizations, in the U.S. context at least, are more often customers or insurers of private firms than they are competitors. One exception to this generalization was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of the 1930s, which was intended to serve as a "yardstick" for private power producers and to spur technological innovation among electric appliance manufacturers and fertilizer makers. The TVA'S "business model" of high-volume, low-cost electricity and electricity-using devices changed the practices of its private competitors, a response which ultimately forced the TVA itself out of these markets. (A few decades later, the TVA served as a lead user of privately-produced nuclear power plants, an effort also intended to serve as an example to private utilities.) 27 Hart Direct government subsidies (including "soft" loans and the like) are a more precise tool for fostering the development of specific technologies than tax breaks, and such policies are sometimes enacted even when the state is not the main customer for the end product. The Airbus consortium, which has benefited from generous government "launch aid," for instance, brought contemporary Europe into the large civilian aircraft industry in the 1980s. Airbus accelerated the pace of innovation in the industry by introducing, among other things, "fly-by-wire" technology.
Withdrawal of U.S. government subsidies for Boeing's supersonic transport (SST) in 1970, by
contrast, ended the SST development effort (probably to Boeing's benefit if one considers the experience of the Concorde). Advocates of such subsidy programs usually claim that they will be temporary and that the firms that they benefit will ultimately be subject to market discipline.
Nonethless, firms receiving even temporary support evolve differently than they would in the absence of such subsidies. The development and production processes of Airbus, for instance, have historically been distributed according to the political weight of its national sponsors, and the firm is also seen as having a special responsibility to keep jobs and contracts in Europe. Another fundamental set of rules establishes property rights, including intellectual property rights (IPR). As with trade restrictions, the state must strike a balance in this area if it is to foster the technological capabilities of its subject firms. Too loose an IPR regime will deter private investment in researchers and knowledge out of fear that competitors will free-ride; too control technology" (as many U.S. environmental laws put it) in place. 37 The regulatory state infiltrates the mindset of actual and would-be innovators more profoundly than does the fiscal state. In a well-functioning regulatory state, the threat of enforcement, rather than enforcement itself, deters smuggling, infringement of property rights, 
The State as Normative Order
The norms that attach to the regulatory state illustrate the fourth mechanism by which the state influences corporate technological capabilities. The shared beliefs and experiences of citzens who serve corporations as scientists, engineers, managers, and workers shape the way that they carry out that service. Nationalism, liberalism, socialism, and plenty of other -isms, not to mention a bundle of less well-articulated elements of political culture, motivate and channel their energy and attention.
The most powerful of these norms has been nationalism. Even the academic scientific community, which maintains a powerful counter-norm of internationalism, has been riven regularly by nationalist sentiment. The fervor with which professors served their nations' militaries in World War I, for instance, stunned the community's idealists. Close collaboration between the national security apparatus and high-technology companies has been even more common than military-academic collaboration. To be sure, money changes hands in these relationships, hopefully from state to business and not the other way around. But they are sealed contemporary Silicon Valley thrives as much on these newcomers as on good old American know-how, although it should be noted that many of these immigrants have been trained in the U.S..
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The End of Business History?
The state shapes the technological capabilities of firms through a variety of mechanisms.
It is a participant in markets, a channeler of financial flows, a maker of rules, and a creator of beliefs and attitudes. Cumulatively, these influences are so profound that the combined technological capabilities of all the firms in each nation differ substantially from one another.
National innovation systems are marked by variations in institutional pattern, innovative output, and technological style. Firms account for much of this variation in large part because they are shaped by states. However, they will be less welcome if their authors strap on the organizational blinders too tightly. Corporate biographies should be of the "life and times" variety, setting their subjects in a social, political, and cultural context. Galambos and Sewell point the way.
The recognition that the state is an intimate partner of the corporation is not the end of business history, but rather a new beginning. This way of thinking expands the range of potentially fruitful loci for research, providing, as I suggested earlier, a checklist of opportunities. We might want to take a closer look, for instance, at corporate functions (and the people who perform them) that span organizational boundaries, particularly between government and industry. Legal, financial, public relations, and government relations offices whose work bears on science and technology come to mind. Consultants might also be interesting subjects.
Moving further away from the organizational approach, business historians might indeed take networks and communities as subjects more often. Studies could be built around perceived problems and the people in a variety of organizations who aim to solve them. They might center There may also be industries, times, and places in which state-corporate interactions that usually lie in the background come to the fore. Moments of contention and transition bring to the surface norms, rules, patterns of allocation, and inter-organizational relationships that are otherwise taken for granted. Historians working in this mode are likely to focus on the emergence of new industries and periods of depression, social conflict, and war. Similarly, studies of technologically lagging countries, including relationships between these countries and the leading countries, seem more promising than those of the leaders themselves in this regard.
We may come to see the Chandlerian firm as a special case of the innovation process that was the product of particular historical conditions. It is ironic that a schema that aimed to make sense of a late nineteenth and early twentieth century phenomenon continues to hold sway in business history at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The era of big government stands between us and Chandler's era, and it may not be over yet, despite the rhetoric issuing from Washington in recent years. I suspect that when historians of economic, scientific, and technological institutions look back fifty years from now, they will be students of some kind of inter-organizational synthesis, which retains the best of contemporary business history but enriches, enlivens, and complicates it. 
